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THE FISHER HYPOTHESIS AND THE FORECASTABILITY 
AND PERSISTENCE OF INFLATION 
For the period 1860 to 193Y. the simple correlation of the U.S. commercial paper rate \vith the 
conlcmporaneous inflation rate is -0.17. The corresponding corrclarion for the period 1950 to 
lY79 is 0.71. This paper attributes this apparent change in the Fisher relation to dilt‘ersnccs in the 
stochastic process of inflation. rather than a change in any structural relationship between interest 
rates and cspectcd inllation. Contrary to recent claims in the litcraturc, thcrc is littlc cvidcncc of 
inflation non-neutrality in data from the prc-World War I period. 
1. Introduction 
The Fisher hypothesis, which states that nominal interest rates rise point- 
for-point with expected inflation, leaving the real rate unaffected, is one of the 
cornerstones of neoclassical monetary theory. Yet prior to World War II, there 
is essentially no evidence of the Fisher effect in data from Britain or the 
United States [see, e.g., Friedman and Schwartz (1976. 1982) and Summers 
(1983)]. For the period 1860 to 1939. the simple correlation of the U.S. 
three-month commercial paper rate with the es post inflation rate over the 
horizon of the bill is - 0.17. The corresponding correlation for the period 1950 
to 1979 is 0.71. 
This essay has three purposes. The first is to explain why data from the 
post-World War II period (particularly post-1960) look more ‘Fisherian’ (in 
the sense of displaying a higher correlation between short-term nominal 
interest rates and measured inflation or proxies for expected inflation) than do 
the pre-war data. I find that one can do better than the argument that the 
financial markets only gradually ‘learned their Fisher’ [Friedman and Schwartz 
(1976, 1982)]. This essay emphasizes, instead, the widely divergent serial 
correlation (in particular, persistence) properties of inflation under direrent 
monetary regimes. Inflation evolved from essentially a white noise process in 
the pre-World War I years, to a highly persistent, non-stationary ARIMA 
process in the post-1960 period. I argue that the appearance of an es post 
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Fisher effect for the first time after 1960 reflects this change in the stochastic 
process of inflation, rather than a change in any structural relationship 
between nominal rates and expected inflation. 
The second focus of this essay is the possible non-neutrality of inflation 
vis-a-vis the real interest rate. Especially prior to World War II. there is a 
drastic negative relationship between the realized inflation rate and the LJ.Y post 
real commercial paper rate. Does such a negative relationship carry over to the 
es atlre real rate? Mishkin (1981) reports that. in data from 1930 to 1980, high 
lagged inflation systematically predicts a significantly lower rs posl real rate. 
which under rational expectations also implies that the e.\- atile real rate is 
negatively correlated with past inflation. Extendin g Mishkin’s analysis to the 
pre-1930 period (especially the gold standard years prior to 1913). 1 find no 
such correlation in these earlier years. Interestingly, the gold standard years. 
which look by far the least Fisherian in regression studies of the relation 
between inflation and nominal interest rates [e.g.. Summers (1983)]. also show 
the least evidence of inflation non-neutrality. The post-war period, which 
shows much evidence of the Fisher elect [Friedman and Schwartz (1982) and 
Cagan (1984)], also indicates a stron g negative relationship between innation 
and the expected real return on short-term linancial instruments. An im- 
portant methodological conclusion is that attempting to estimate the response 
of nominal interest rates to inflation may not be the most reliable approach to 
studying whether expected inflation lowers real rates or whether financial 
markets exhibit inflation illusion. 
I find little evidence of the non-neutrality of inflation in data from the gold 
standard period. This contradicts the conclusion of a frequently cited study by 
Summers (1983). which examines the relationship betwen interest rates and 
inflation using band spectral regression. My third goal in this essay is to 
understand the discrepancy between my inference and that of Summers 
(1983), and to challenge the validity of Summers’ conclusions. To a large 
extent, this argument follows easily from the previous sections of the paper. 
Inflation in this early period was very nearly white noise. so that the variance 
of anticipated inflation was very small relative to the variance of realized 
inflation. This would lead to a massive errors-in-variables problem in ordinary 
least squares regression. causing the investigator to conclude incorrectly that 
interest rates failed to respond to expected inflation. However, the question 
remains whether or not band filtering the data, leaving only low-frequency 
components. alleviates the problem because ‘low-frequency variations in the 
rate of inflation are almost completely forecastable, so the assumption that 
expected inflation can be proxied by actual intlation is warranted’ [Summers 
(1983, p. 216)l.I 
‘As 1 make clear in section 5. Summers’ principal intent in choosing the band spcctrd rcchniquc 
wds not lo treat the errors-in-variables problem but instead to treat the txdopcncity problem 11131 
arks if inllarion and real rata art’ simulrancouslv determined in the short run. 
McCallum (1984) shows that low-frequency estimation is not in general 
robust against misspecifcation of the distinction between anticipated and 
unanticipated movements in the regressors, but gives no indication of the 
empirical importance of his critique. I show that data on interest rates and 
inflation from the pre-World War I period in the United States represent a 
particularly unfortunate confrontation between McCallum’s general problem 
and the stochastic environment. Deriving and implementing a frequency 
domain version of the Theil misspecification theorem. I find that the covari- 
ante between anticipated and cs ~josi intlation displays IJO tendency to 
increase (relative to the variance of inflation) as the frequency is lowered. 
The plan of this essay is as follows. Section 2 examines the serial correlation. 
persistence and forecastability of inflation in the several subperiods. and their 
implications for the Fisher erect under a limited information version of 
rational expectations. Section 3 applies the Mishkin (1981) approach to the 
study of real interest rates and inflation in an attempt to answer the question 
of whether periods of generally higher inflation rates were associated with a 
lower e.v ~llfe real interest rate. Section 4 tests (and does not reject) the 
hypothesis that. despite the markedly diKerent (es posr) decadal mean intla- 
tion rates in the gold standard period, the population mean was constant 
across decades. Section 5 presents a misspecification analysis of the Summers 
(1983) study of the long-run Fisher hypothesis in the frequency domain. 
Section 6 contains a brief summary and some conclusions. 
2. Inflation persistence and the appearance of an ex post Fisher effect 
A number of authors have documented that the behavior of the hivariate 
stochastic process of short-term interest rates and inflation shows a marked 
change somewhere between the end of the classical gold standard and the 
beginning of the 1960’s [see. in particular, Sargent (1973). Klein (197s). Shiller 
and Siegel (1977). Friedman and Schwartz (1976. 19SZ). Summers (1983). 
Barthold and Dougan (1985)]. The essence of this change is that interest rates 
displayed a zero (or slightly negative) correlation with contemporaneous 
inflation prior to 1930. while a strongly positive correlation has been observed 
since about 1960. I shall refer to a strong correlation between nominal interest 
rates and realized inllation as an ex posr Fisher ell‘ect (as distinguished from 
the es alIfe Fisher effect. an unobservable relationship between nominal rates 
and underlying expected inflation). 
In this section I develop relations linkin, 0 the correlation between interest 
rates and inflation to the serial correlation. or persistence, properties of 
inflation. and to the percentage of forecastable variation in inflation. I go on to 
show. based on comparative analysis of the pre- and post-1913 intlation 
processes. that the simple considerations developed here explain at least the 
gross features of the dramatic historical change in the relationship between 
interest rates and inflation. 
.?. 1. Implications of forecastabilitj- and persistence 
Following McCallum (1983), suppose that the underlying model generating 
nominal interest rates is i, = p + E,[T,.+ 1] + E,. For now. let E, be a white noise 
uncorrelated with 7r,, r,+,, and E,[r,+,]: this will be relaxed somewhat in 
section 5, where we consider estimation in the frequency domain. A regression 
of the nominal rate i, on r,. the inflation rate just realized, yields an estimated 
coefficient with probability limit cov(i,. r,)/var( 71). This probability limit is in 
turn just the first-order serial correlation coefficient of inflation. regardless of 
the (stationary) process generatin g inflation. since (under our assumptions) 
cov( i,, 7~,) = cov( 7r,+ 1, r,).: If inflation is nearly serially uncorrelated, an’inves- 
tigator regressing i, on V, would obtain a coefficient close to zero. and 
conclude that there is ‘no Fisher erect’. even though Fisher’s theory is built 
into the underlying model. Thus, under this scenario, regression of the 
nominal interest rate on inflation measures the persistence of inflation rather 
than the response of interest rates to inflationary expectations. 
Alternatively. consider the regression of the nominal interest rate on the 
es post inflation rate realized at the maturity of the bill. Under our hypothe- 
sised underlying model, this corresponds to the case of classical errors in 
variables. and the probability limit of the estimated coetIicient is 
var(E,[r,+,])/var(m). This probability limit corresponds to plim( R’) from a 
regression of v,+, on all of the variables in the agents’ information sets that 
would have been relevant to one-step-ahead forecasting of intlation. The 
estimated ‘Fisher coefficient’ from this regression will have probability limit 
zero if inflation is a martingale diff‘erence with respect to all of the relevant 
information. A regression of the nominal rate on OS post inflation measures 
the percentage of forecastable variation in inflation. and (once again) is not a 
test of Fisher’s hypothesis about nominal rates and expected inflation. 
In summary, regression of i, on r, tells us something about the persistence 
of inflation, while regression of i, on n,+l is likely to convey information 
about the forecastability of inflation, as measured by the percentage of total 
variation in inflation that agents were able to forecast on the basis of 
information including. but not limited to, inflation’s own past. In the highly 
simplified model given above, these are the OH!,, considerations reflected in the 
regressions, since the Fisher hypothesis of full adjustment for expected intla- 
tion was built into the structure. More generally, as discussed in Summers 
(1983) and in section 5 of this paper. the real rate will exhibit systematic 
(rather than merely white noise) variation, and regressions of i, on r, or n,,., 
will reflect this fact as well.3 This in no way undermines the point that we have 
made: a full underlying, or es ante. Fisher effect is consistent with any 
‘If inflation follows a non-stationary procrss with a unit root, the regression of I, on TT, \\ould 
yield a coetlicicnt of unity asymptotically. even if T, is not a random walk. 
‘For this reason, I do not test a formal restriction that the coefticient of intlation in the interest 
rate equation should equal the first-order serial correlation of inflation. 
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observed correlation between i, and r, or T,+~. Even when other conditions 
are favorable (i.e., variation in the real rate is uncorrelated with inflation), a 
strong ex post Fisher effect will appear in the data only when inflation is 
highly persistent and/or forecastable. 
One modification of the Fisherian model with E, white noise wili prove 
useful. If inflation is a martingale difference, as I am about to show was 
apparently the case prior to World War i, the above model predicts that 
nominal interest rates will also be white noise. In fact, nominal rates prior to 
1913 followed highly persistent processes, although they were not a random 
walk [Mankiw and Miron (1986)]. One can easily accocr,: for the coexistence 
of interest rate persistence and serially uncorrelated inflation by letting E,, 
which represents real rate variation, follow an ARMA process. It is useful to 
think of a version of Fisher’s underlying theory obtaining as long as E, is 
uncorrelated with current, lagged, and future 7~,; i.e., real rate variation has a 
life of its own, independent of the inflation process. Our essential results from 
above continue to hold; interest rates will display no correlation with V, if 
inflation is serially uncorrelated (or with v,+~ if inflation is unforecastable 
from other information as well), although the underlying model incorporates 
full adjustment of interest rates for expected inAation. The variation in 
nominal rates under this formulation is indicative entirely of real rate varia- 
tion. 
2.2. Persistence and forecastability of inflation from the gold standard to the 
present: Empirical analysis 
2.2.1. Data 
I examine data from both the United States and Britain. The U.S. data are 
quarterly. I use the Warren-Pearson all-items wholesale price index prior to 
1919, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index thereafter. 
Prices are taken from the third month of each quarter to limit the problem of 
time aggregation (which distorts the serial correlation properties of the result- 
ing inflation rates), and to match as closely as possible (with respect to timing) 
the three-month commercial paper rate taken from the first month of the 
quarter. 
The British data are annual, and were constructed by linking the Elizabeth 
Schumpeter consumer price series with the Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz 
index and the Sauerbeck-Statist series [all found in Mitchell and Deane 
(1962)], as in Shiller and Siegel (1977) and Barsky and Summers (1985). 
2.2.2. Persistence 
Table 1 presents estimated autocorrelation functions for various subperiods 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































data from the different monetary regimes is striking. Pre-World War I inflation 
shows no sign of persistence at all, while the data from 1914 to 1959 show 
non-trivial, though moderate positive serial correlation. Finally, post-1960 
inflation shows very great persistence. 
Prior to World War I, inflation in both the United States and Britain was 
very nearly white noise, as indicated by the substantively small estimated 
autocorrelations. most of which are also (individually) statistically insignifi- 
cant.4 Note. in particular, that the first-order autocorrelations. which are the 
‘predicted’ regression coefficients for the regression of i, on r,, are essentially 
zero. The Q-statistics, which test the joint hypothesis that the first II autocorre- 
lations are all zero for specified II, do not reject the white noise hypothesis for 
the U.S. although for the British annual data that hypothesis is formally 
rejected at the one percent significance level. These rejections reflect the 
estimates for lags three through five, all of which are negative. The predomi- 
nance of negative serial correlation in inflation from the gold standard period 
was noted earlier by Klein (1975).’ 
It is striking that the data from the pre-Worid War I gold standard years 
show jro sign of positive serial correlation. To the extent that there is some 
negative serial correlation, this could be indicative of ‘business cycles’. as 
suggested by Sargent (1973). or adjustments peculiar to a gold standard [see, 
e.g., Rockoff (1984) and Barsky and Summers (1985)]. One might note. 
however, that plausible moving average measurement error in the underlying 
price data would also lead to a predominance of negative values in the 
correlogram of the inflation series. Thus the true inflation data may have been 
even closer to white noise than the measured series. 
An alternative (though isomorphic) characterization of the behavior of 
inflation over the past two and a half centuries makes use of frequency domain 
techniques. Instead of estimating spectral densities - which involves an im- 
portant judgemental aspect, since smoothing is required to obtain consistent 
estimates - I present the results of the Durbin cumulative periodogram test 
[see. e.g., Malinvaud (1980)]. This compares the sum of the periodogram values 
(beginning at the low-frequency end) with a 45 degree line through the origin. 
the integrated spectral density of theoretical white noise. The 45 degree line 
(not shown explicitly) is flanked by confidence bounds derived under the null 
hypothesis of white noise. Note that no ad hoc decisions need to be made in 
order to implement this procedure. 
‘Very similar resulrs obtain beginning in 1880. or splitting the sample at 1X96 and csamining 
the two halves separately. 
‘Although his emphasis is somewhat dilTerent. Klein (1975). in noting the implications of the 
serial correlation of inflauon for interest rate determination, anticipated some of the present 
analysis. Ibrahim and Williams (1978) suggested that the Fisher hypothesis may not be testable 
using older data because of the absence of positive serial corrrlatlon in inflation rates. a point 
which also anticipates the argument of this paper. 
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 
Fig. la. Cumulative pcriodogram of U.S. intlation. 1870-lY13 (quarterly). 
0.25 
0.00 
1 16 31 46 61 76 91 106 
Fig. lb. Cumulative periodogram of British inllation. 172Y-lY13 (annual). 
Figs. la, lb, and lc show the cumulative periodogram with confidence 
bounds for the U.S. from 1870 to 1913, Britain from 1729 to 1913, and the 
U.S. from 1940 to 1979, respectively. The results here simply restate in terms 
of frequencies our previous conclusions. Since the cumulative periodogram in 
fig. la stays well within the region bounded by the two parallel diagonals, the 
early U.S. data show no departure at all from random behavior. The long 




1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 
Fig. lc. Cumulative periodogram of U.S. inflation, 1940-1979 (quarterly). 
(i.e., ‘business cycle’) frequencies. The 1940 to 1979 U.S. sample is sufficiently 
concentrated in the low frequencies (i.e., persistent) that the cumulative 
periodogram exceeds the upper bound from the beginning. Note that the slope 
is steeper than that of the 45 degree line until the upper third or so of the 
frequency band, where it becomes flatter, confirming that the higher frequen- 
cies contribute proportionately less to the variance of this series than to a 
white noise series. 
Table 2 summarizes my Box-Jenkins identifications for United States 
inflation over the past 140 years. I experimented with ARMA models even for 
the 1870 to 1913 sample, but asymptotic F-tests of the hypothesis that all of 
Table 2 
ARIMA models for inflation, 1x70-1979. quarterly U.S. data 
Sample period Identification Fitted model 
1870-1913 Essentially white noise x, = E, 
1919-193X AR(Z) s,= - 0.30 + 0.42 s,_, + 0.17 .Y,-z + E, 
(0.84) (0.11) (0.12) 
1947-1959 AR(l) x,= 1.63 + 0.33 .\',m, + E, 
(0.65) (0.14) 
1960-1979 IMA(1.1) s, = s,+ , - 0.46 E,-, + E, 
(0.09) 
12 R.B. Bursky. The Fisher ltyporhesis utd it&trim forec~t.wthilig 
the coefficients are zero did not reject. ’ For subperiods of 1913 to 1979, I 
obtained parameter estimates which yielded approximately white noise residu- 
als. These are shown in the column at right. Note that I identify the 1960 to 
1979 inflation process as a non-stationary IMA (1,l). The estimated fraction 
of each period’s innovation that is permanent is about 0.5. 
All of the results presented here accentuate the marked change that inflation 
underwent over the last seventy years. Inflations prior to 1913 displayed no 
tendency to persist. If anything, there was a slight tendency for inflations to be 
followed by deflation two to four years later. From 1913 to 1979 the per- 
sistence of inflation became progressively greater. The great momentum of 
inflation in the last twenty years or so is reflected in an ARIMA representation 
with a unit root. As noted by Granger and Newbold (1977), forecasting the 
level of an integrated series is a relatively easy task. This is reflected in the 
strong correlation between interest rates and inflation seen after 1960. 
The greater the persistence of inflation, the more expected inflation will 
resemble current inflation, and hence the stronger will be the appearance of an 
ex post Fisher effect. In particular, this regularity will hold over a class of 
models in which di/dlre, the response of nominal interest rates to true 
expected inflation, is identically unity, as required for superneutrality. Thus 
the correlation between nominal interest rates and realized inflation may say 
more about the stochastic process followed by inflation than about the truth of 
Fisher’s theory that expected real interest rates are orthogonal to inflation. In 
section 5, I show that this continues to be true even at the low frequencies. 
2.2.3. Forecastability 
As noted above, it is impossible to say with complete confidence how 
forecastable inflation was in a particular historical setting, since we have 
access to at most a subset of the agents’ information sets. In this section, I 
focus on the percentage of total variation explained by inflation’s own past 
and by lagged gold production to obtain a ‘limited information’ metric of 
forecastability. I use the ‘corrected’ squared correlation coefficient 
%ummers (1984) reports that regressions of interest rates on ARIMA forecasts of inflation 
yielded results virtually identical to those from regressions of interest on es post inllation for the 
pre-1930 period. Summers argues that the regressions using ARIMA forecasts arc robust against 
the charge of specification error made by McCallum (19X4). Our asymptotic F-tests do not 
support Summers’ claim. The ARIMA models have no explanatory power. However, the coeffi- 
cients estimated from finite samples will not be identically zero. and therefore the forecasts display 
considerable spurious variation. 
R.B. Barsky, The Fisher h.vporhesis und iufatiott forecastahili!v 13 
Table 3 
x”s from regressions of U.S. inflation on lagged information. 
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so that results involving different numbers of lagged regressors will be com- 
parable. Note that as the sample size increases, R” converges in probability to 
the ratio of the variance of the ‘forecastable component’ to the total variance. 
Table 3 presents x2’s from regressions of U.S. inflation on lagged informa- 
tion from the various subperiods. In addition to univariate autoregressions, 
regressions using the growth of the world monetary gold stock from Kitchin 
(1930) are shown. The gold stock regressions necessitate the use of annual 
data. The choice of the growth rate of world gold stocks as a forecasting 
variable was suggested by what I call the ‘ traditional view’ of price movements 
during the gold standard period, to be discussed further in section 3. Briefly, 
this view attributes the major swings in prices prior to 1913 to changes in the 
rate of gold production, particularly as a result of discoveries of new gold and 
improved methods of extraction. 
The results in table 3 suggest that the forecastability of inflation underwent 
the same evolution that characterized inflation persistence. Past inflation 
explained none of the variance of current inflation prior to 1913. Lagged gold 
production was somewhat more useful. However, it is somewhat doubtful 
whether agents had access to all of the information about gold production 
reflected in the data used here, which were not assembled until 1930. Inflation 
shows a moderate degree of forecastability between 1919 and 1959, with R”‘s 
based on past inflation alone on the order of 20 percent. Finally, inflation 
from 1960 to 1979 was highly forecastable. Three quarters of the variation in 
inflation from this period could have been foreseen from the past behavior of 
inflation alone. The increased forecastability and persistence of inflation since 
1913 (and especially since 1960) account impressively for the gross features of 
the historical evolution of the relationship between interest rates and inflation. 
In particular, the complete absence of an ex post Fisher effect prior to 1913 
and the strong emergence of such an effect after 1960 are fully rationalized. 
Some puzzles remain. The rather abrupt appearance of mild inflation 
persistence afer 1914 was not met even by a small increase in the correlation 
between interest rates and inflation, in contradiction to the implications of the 
illustrative model presented in this section. The period between 1914 and 1953 
was characterized by so many special circumstances - two world wars, the 
Great Depression. price controls, and a massive interest rate pegging 
program - however. that it is not clear what to make of this failure. 
3. Real interest rates and inflation non-neutrality: 
Evidence from the pre-1914 period 
The essence of Fisher’s hypothesis is that nominal interest rates are set so 
that forecustahle inflations do not systematically lower real interest rates. Thus 
an alternative approach to testing the Fisher proposition focuses on its 
implication that the es post real rate should bear no systematic relationship to 
lagged inflation. Mishkin (1981) notes that if X,p is the projection of the 
es unre real rate on any information set known at time f (represented by the 
vector X,). the projection of the es posr real rate on that same information set 
is also X,/3. This follows from the fact that. under rational expectations, the 
projection of the expectational error on X, must equal zero. As noted by 
Mishkin (1981). these regressions have no structural interpretation. However. 
if the paradigm of Summers (1983). in which ‘high-inflation’ decades alter- 
nated with periods of deflation or low inflation, and in which nominal rates 
failed to adjust for these regime changes. really characterized the pre-1940 
period, regression of ex posr real commercial paper rates on a number of lags 
of inflation should yield a significantly negative estimate of the sum of the 
coefficients. 
Table 4 presents regression results involving three-month U.S. commercial 
paper rates and four, eight, and twenty quarters of lagged inflation. F-tests of 
the hypothesis that the lagged inflation rates do not help predict the ex post 
real rate are shown in the final column. For 1870 to 1913, the hypothesis that 
lagged inflation rates are irrelevant for predicting the es post real rate is not 
rejected for any choice of the number of lags. For the post-1930 period, that 
hypothesis is soundly rejected. After 1930, real rates were on average lower 








Regression of U.S. real commercial paper rates on lagged information. 
Sum of lag coefficients 
Number of (standard errors in x2 
lags parentheses) 
(A) Lugged irflution 
4 - 0.07 - 0.01 
(0.15) 
8 - 0.02 - 0.01 
(0.22) 
20 - 0.32 0.06 
(0.31) 
4 - 0.61 0.27 
(0.08) 
8 -0.55 0.29 
(0.09) 
20 -0.57 0.30 
(0.11) 
(B) Lagged inflation, Nominul rate 
4 -0.11 (E) 0.06 
(0.10) 
(C) Lugged growth of monetary gold 
1 -2.4 0.16 
(0.80) 
5 - 2.3 0.22 
(0.86) 
F-test of significance 
of regression 
F(4,171) = 0.69 
F(8.167) = 0.84 
F(20,155) = 1.55 
F(4,195) = 19.45 
F(8,191) = 11.27 
F(209179) = 5.17 
F(5.170) = 3.4 
F(1.41) = 9.0 
F(5,37) = 3.35 
during inflationary periods. This conclusion continues to hold when the 1930’s 
and 1940’s are omitted (not shown here). 
These results distinctly fail to lend support to the view that non-neutrality 
of inflation characterized the period prior to 1913. They do suggest that 
inflation non-neutrality may have characterized the post-1930 and post-1950 
periods. The earlier years are usually thought of as the least ‘Fisherian’ 
because of the absence of close co-movement of nominal rates and ex post 
inflation, while the post-1950 period is characterized by a high correlation of 
realized inflation and nominal rates. Yet, when the Fisher theory is restated in 
such a way that the expectational error is in the left-hand-side variable, it is 
the pre-1913 period which provides the least evidence against Fisher’s neutral- 
ity theory. 
Since the nominal rate is known at time t, it is appropriate to add it to the 
information set, alongside lagged inflation. This is done in the middle set of 
entries in table 4. The coefficient of the nominal rate and its standard error are 
shown, in addition to the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation and its 
standard error. The results are quite strikin g. Lagged inflation continues to be 
irrelevant for predicting the es post real rate. The nominal rate is a statistically 
significant predictor of the real rate. although the R’ is quite low. The 
estimates are consistent with the view that changes in nominal rates indicated 
changes in real rates on a one-for-one basis prior to 1913. a hypothesis put 
forth by Shiller and Siegel (1977). 
In the previous section of this paper, we found that inflation during the gold 
standard years was nearly white noise. implying that the price level was 
essentially a random walk. A more traditional view [see Delong (1985) and 
Cagan (1984) for recent restatements] divides the 1870 to 1913 period into two 
segments: an era of generally declining prices from 1870 until 1896 and an 
inflationary period after 1896. To the extent that this ‘traditional view’ is 
based on an examination of plots of the price series alone. it requires little 
discussion; the appearance es post of spurious trends in random walks is a 
well known phenomenon. A more sophisticated version of the traditional view 
emphasizes changes in the trend growth of world gold stocks. Prior to 1896 the 
argument goes, a dearth of gold discoveries combined with a high growth rate 
of potential GNP lead to a deflationary regime; after 1896. new sources in 
South Africa and Australia combined with the discovery of the cyanide 
process lead to more rapid increases in the world stock of gold, and hence 
inflation. Furthermore. it is claimed [Delong (1985)], agents living at the time 
were aware of a switch from a deflationary to an inflationary regime. 
Underlying the Summers (1983.1984) view that the gold standard provides 
substantial evidence against the Fisher hypothesis is the notion that the period 
included important swings in the trend growth of prices. Since the univariate 
inflation process is white noise, it shows no evidence of such variation. The 
possibility remains that the alleged ‘regime change’, along with a failure of 
nominal interest rates to adjust. would be reflected in a negative relationship 
between real rates and recent rates of gold production. Thus, the final entries 
in table 4 show the results of regressions of real interest rates on lagged growth 
rates of the world gold stock from Kitchin (1930). This necessitated a move to 
annual data. Real interest rates do show a stronger negative relationship to 
lagged gold production than to lagged inflation. which corresponds to our 
finding in section 2 that inflation was somewhat forecastable from lagged gold 
production numbers. If there is an argument in defense of Summers (1983), it 
is likely to be based on the forecastability of inflation from lagged gold 
growth. rather than any features of the univariate inflation process. However, 
there are alternative scenarios other than inflation non-neutrality which could 
also have lead to a correlation between real rates and the growth of the gold 
stock.’ 
‘For example. consider rhe model used by Rarsky and Summers (1985) to study Gibson’s 
Paradox. An announcement that real rates tvould be lower in the future would cause an-immediate 
rise in the relative price of gold. This \vould lead to incrcascd gold production now. leading to a 
negative correlation between current gold production and future real rates. 
4. Variation in inflation within and between decades 
Summers (1983) prints decadal mean inflation rates for 1860 to 1940, and 
argues that their substantially varyin g values indicate important changes in 
trend inflation that should not have been ignored by bondholders. To test the 
validity of this claim, we might ask whether the data provide evidence that the 
populuriorz means in fact varied across decades. This is the problem of ‘one 
way analysis of variance’. The null hypothesis that the decadal means were all 
equal can be tested with the statistic 
where f is the ‘pooled’ sample mean and .Y-, is the mean for decade .j. The 
statistic is distributed F,-,.,-, [Rao (1973)]. The numerator represents the 
variation berMlee? decades. while the denominator measures the within vari- 
ation. Only if the ‘between’ variation is of sufficient relative magnitude is the 
hypothesis of equality rejected. 
Table 5 presents the analysis of variance for the subperiods 1870 to 1909, 
1860 to 1939, and 1940 to 1979. Only for the post-1940 decades is there strong 
ground for reject+. For the earlier periods. the F-statistics are surprisingly 
small, reflecting the large amount of within-decade variation in the inflation 
rates. The observed variation in sample means is consistent with a constant 
population mean up to 1940. 
It is true that the foregoing tests assume constancy of the population 
variance, and that this can sometimes be rejected by the data. For instance. the 
Table 5 










Dcgrccs of Sum of Mean \ionific;mcc .z 
freedom squaws squurs F Icvcl 
3 0.0705 O.OObS 1.41 0.7b 
3b 0.1745 0.0049 
3s, 0.195 
7 0 105 0.015 l.b9 0.13 
77 0.6419R o.oosu 
i3 0.747 
1940-1979 bewwn 3 0.0166 0.00553 4.b5 0.01 
within 36 0.0417s 0.00119 
lOlaI % 0.0593s 
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variability of inflation was especially great during the Civil War decade of the 
1860’s and the World War I period 1910 to 1919. However, Box (1954) shows 
that, as long as the number of data points in each cell is the same, the bias in 
the test from falsely maintaining a constant population variance is always in 
favor of rejection. Thus failure to reject in the early decades cannot be 
attributed to bias from the maintained hypothesis of a constant population 
variance. 
The results in this section cast serious doubt on the view that there were 
‘high inflation’ and ‘low inflation’ (or deflationary) decades during the gold 
standard period. When one allows for the possibility of sampling variation, the 
likelihood emerges that the appearance of changes in the trend growth of 
prices so central to the arguments of Summers (1983), Cagan (1984) and 
Delong (1985) is spurious. 8 Our findings thus further undermine the view that 
data from the gold standard years can provide substantive evidence against 
inflation neutrality. 
5. Specification analysis of Summers’ spectral estimates of the Fisher equation 
Summers (1983) uses band spectral regression to filter out high-frequency 
components of the inflation and interest rate data, and estimate a ‘long-run’ 
Fisher equation. Summers argues for this procedure on the grounds that: (1) 
economic theory suggests approximate super-neutrality of money only as a 
steady state proposition; and (2) low-frequency estimation is robust against 
the errors-in-variables problem that arises from the use of actual inflation as a 
proxy for anticipated inflation. 
Summers (1983) did not emphasize the errors-in-variables issue, preferring 
to focus on point (1). The choice of the band spectral technique to deal with 
the short-run joint endogeneity of inflation and real rates was an innovative 
one. Appropriate inference, however, depends also on the truth of the second 
claim, on which this section focuses. I first show that it is not correct in 
general, a point previously made in a slightly different way by McCallum 
(1984). I then go on to show that for the 1870 to 1913 period in particular it 
leads to extremely misleading conclusions. 
Suppose that the ‘true’ population model is i, = p + E,[n,+,] + E,, so that 
rationally expected inflation appears with a coefficient of unity, p is the 
unconditional expectation of the real rate, and E reflects variation in the 
ex ante real rate. In general, E, will be correlated with E,[n,+,], as well as 
serially correlated. Thus, even if it were possible to observe inflationary 
expectations exactly, OLS estimation of the above relation would not be 
meaningful. 
‘My calculations agree with DeLong (1985) that if one splits the sample around the 1896 
turning point, a ‘t-test’ rejects equality of the two means. But such an w posr choice for the 
breaking point hardly seems legitimate. 
Let us assume, however [with Summers (1983)]. that the steady state 
superneutrality result properly implies the absence of low-frequenq~ correlation 
between E, and E,[r,+,]. In other words, we assume that if we could observe 
true expected inflation, the low-frequency band spectral estimate of its coeffi- 
cient would have probability limit equal to unity. In fact. in order to isolate 
the eRect of proxying expected inflation with v,, let us go a step further and 
proceed as if E, is uncorrelated with both E,[r,+ i] and r, at all frequencies. If 
regression of i, on V, does not make sense in this most favorable of cir- 
cumstances, it will be no better when endogeneity (of r, or E,[r,+,]) is 
readmitted. 
We can now ask what the probability limit of the band spectral estimator B 
over specified frequencies will be. This is given by plim B = /S,,,,(o)/]Sn. ,( a). 
where S,.,(w) is the (population) cross-spectrum of interest and intla- 
tion, S,*,(w) is the spectrum of inflation, and the integral is taken over the 
specified frequency band (-w, G)). Under our assumptions. plim B = 
PEh,,, l.,,//Sn,T and is thus equal to the band spectral regression (over the 
same frequency band) of expected inflation at t + 1 on actual inflation at t. 
If the integrals are taken over the entire interval (--7~. n). the probabil- 
ity limit of the OLS estimator is obtained, and this is seen to be 
cov( 7r,, E,[T~+ ,])/var(r,). This coincides with the standard Theil (1957) specih- 
cation error result: the estimated coefficient in a regression with an erroneous 
explanatory variable differs (for large samples) multiplicatively from the true 
coefficient by the regression of the ‘correct’ explanatory variable on the 
erroneous, included one. Letting p be the correlation between n, and E,[r,+ ,I, 
note that cov(~,,E,[7r,+i])/var(~,) = pa(E,[7r,+,])/a(~,) -C 1. since p < 1 and a 
rational forecast varies less than the series being forecast. Thus the OLS 
estimate of the response of i to expected inflation must be biased downward 
as long as inflation is a stationary series. The extent of this bias depends on the 
stochastic process followed by inflation. In the limit as r approaches white 
noise behavior, cov( v,, E,[ V, + i ])/var( r,) approaches zero, and regression of i 
on 7~ will yield a zero coefficient even though a full response of i to expected 
inflation obtains by hypothesis, 
Does the situation improve as we focus on the relation at lower frequencies? 
Suppose that 7~ has an autoregressive representation r,+ i = A(L)r, + E,, and 
that expectations are based on the univariate process followed by inflation. 
Then plim B = /A(e-‘“), the integration once again taking place over ( - 0, w). 
The probability limit of the limiting zero frequency estimator (the limit of the 
integral as w -+ 0) is just the sum of the coefficients in the autoregressive 
representation of 7~. Only if these coefficients sum to unity does low-frequency 
estimation circumvent (in the limit) the specification bias from using V, in 
place of E,[r,+, . ] Alternatively, the required condition is that the process 
generating inflation have a unit root [Box and Jenkins (1976. p. 102)]. The 
IMA (1,l) process is a noteworthy special case. It should not be surprising if 
low-frequency regression results from a period in which inflation followed an 
20 R.B. Bursky. The Fisher hypothesis and ir~fkl~iotr jorecustuhility 
Table 6 
‘Auxilliary regressions’ of E,( r,+ , ) on v,. 
Sample period Coefficient of r, si’ 
1870-1913 0.02 - 0.00 
(0.02) 
1930-1979 0.34 0.31 
(0.03) 
1960-1979 0.58 0.60 
(0.05) 
IMA (1,l) process appear more favorable to the Fisher effect than results from 
a period in which inflation was nearly white noise. 
It is not hard to implement the above formulae under the assumption that 
inflationary expectations do not differ too much from the predictions of a 
univariate ARIMA model. The procedure is to generate ARIMA forecasts and 
then to compute the ‘auxilliary regression’ [Theil (1957)] of the one-step-ahead 
inflation forecast on inflation at t. Corresponding to each quarter from 1860 to 
1980, I estimated an ARMA (1,l) model using the previous eighty observa- 
tions (and hence only information that would have been available to agents at 
the time of the forecast), and computed the one-step-ahead predictions. 
Table 6 presents OLS regressions of E,[r,+,] on 7, for the subperiods 1870 
to 1913, 1930 to 1979, and 1960 to 1979. Figs. 2a through 2c show the gain 
kh+, t,,,.( w)]/S~.~( o) as a function of frequency. The gain (or transfer 
function) indicates the magnitude of the relationship between the two series at 
each frequency. For the 1870 to 1913 period, the OLS relation between 
inflation at t and the one-step-ahead inflation forecast is negligible, and there 
is no tendency for this relation to strengthen at lower frequencies. In the later 
periods, on the other hand, a substantial OLS relationship appears, and the 
downward-sloping gain function shows that the coefficient at lower frequen- 
cies is larger than that at high frequencies, and larger than the OLS regression 
coefficient. The 1960 to 1979 results are particularly striking in this regard. The 
coefficient approaches one closely for long cycles. This is precisely the period 
in which we identified inflation as an IMA (1.1) process. 
We thus can account for the coefficient estimates obtained by Summers 
solely in terms of the stochastic properties of inflation, i.e., in a model in 
which the adjustment of nominal interest rates to rationally expected inflation 
is always one-for-one. The more ‘Fisherian’ results for the post-1930 and 
particularly the post-1960 period appear to reflect an increase in the extent to 
which (a smoothed version of) actual inflation proxies for expected inflation 
rather than a change in the structural relationship between interest rates and 
expected inflation. Even more surprisingly, the estimated gain functions sug- 




Fig. 2a. Gain function. U.S. inflation, lS70-1’913. 
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Fig. 2b. Gain function. U.S. inflakm. 1930-1979. 
gest that the apparent strengthening of the Fisher relation at lower frequencies 
in the post-1930 data may also reflect properties of the intlation process rather 
than short-run vs. long-run adjustment to expected inflation. Recall that the 
gain functions shown above are estimates of what the band spectral regression 
coefficient of i on acrual inflation ‘should’ be under the maintained hypothe- 
ses of full adjustment to expected inflation and (limited information) rational 
expectations. The closeness of these hypothetical coefficients to those actually 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
In assessing empirical evidence on the Fisher hypothesis, it is important to 
distinguish between two quite separate issues. The first is the degree of 
correlation between nominal interest rates and realized inflation. The second is 
the relationship between expected inflation and expected real rates. 
This paper concurs fully with Summers (1983) in the conclusion that 
essentially none of the variance of nominal interest rates prior to 1930 is 
accounted for by inflation, actual or expected. However, I do not conclude 
that the data, at least those prior to 1913. show much evidence of inflation 
illusion or non-neutrality of expected inflation vis-a-vis real rates. The time 
series properties of inflation prior to 1913 suggest that the relationship 
between actual inflation and expected inflation in this period was negligible 
(although there are some caveats regarding lagged gold production), and was 
no stronger at low frequencies than at high ones. The estimated non-response 
of nominal rates to inflation in these data is as likely a reflection of this 
phenomenon as it is evidence of a non-adjustment of nominal rates to 
expecred inflation. Indeed, when the Fisher equation is ‘turned around’ so that 
the expectational error is associated with the left-hand-side variable rather 
than the regressor, no significantly negative relationship between real rates and 
inflation appears. 
I conclude with an important caveat. One way of restating the main 
empirical result of this paper is that there was probably little variation in 
expected inflation prior to 1913. Thus, although this period cannot provide 
significant evidence against Fisher’s hypothesis, neither can it tell us what 
would have happened if expected inflation had varied widely. It would be 
R. B. Barsky, The Fisher hypothesis and infiation forecastability 23 
wrong to conclude that the early period provides positive evidence in favor of 
Fisher. However, when the data from the gold standard years are understood 
within the framework of this paper, much of the apparently overwhelming case 
against the Fisher hypothesis disappears. 
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